I think taking "relative power" rather than resource bargaining as the relevant variable makes things clearer - and explains a decent subset of rational wars.
In a multi-polar world, two warring factions can lose both power and resources by going to war. If the Elven and Dwarven kingdoms are, say, beset by Undead hordes from the North, it may indeed be irrational of them to go to a costly war with each other, because both actors' power relative to the external threat diminishes.
But my sense is that, if there are no real external threats (either because one party is a superpower, or two tribes are fighting over an isolated pacific island), war can be better modelled as a zero-sum game for relative power than a negative-sum game for resources. The destruction of rival political factions is usually a very rational end in itself! Short term resource loss becomes less relevant, and a victor ends the war with far greater political power, which will give incredible pay-offs across generations!
Also, (a novel take, maybe) perhaps this combines with biases/irrational factors (survivorship bias) - most countries have a history of a glorious, successful, more zero-sum war with generational pay-offs (because this tends to be how countries get made), so they presume that future wars may have a similar payoff.
I'm worried that the "relative power" angle takes the "game" part of game theory a bit too literally. Like in a game of Civilization (or, in keeping with the fantasy theme, Smallville) the only check on your desire for power are other states/third parties.
So even a 0.01% chance of winning is better than a guaranteed loss of surrendering your territory.
But in real life, as long as you have literally any other goal than relative power, it behooves you to look for peaceful solutions to pursue them, if you know for sure (or with high probability) that you'd lose a war for sure. Perhaps the elves would prefer being subjugated to the Dwarven Empire to total eradication, or they'd rather be exiles, for example.
I think taking "relative power" rather than resource bargaining as the relevant variable makes things clearer - and explains a decent subset of rational wars.
In a multi-polar world, two warring factions can lose both power and resources by going to war. If the Elven and Dwarven kingdoms are, say, beset by Undead hordes from the North, it may indeed be irrational of them to go to a costly war with each other, because both actors' power relative to the external threat diminishes.
But my sense is that, if there are no real external threats (either because one party is a superpower, or two tribes are fighting over an isolated pacific island), war can be better modelled as a zero-sum game for relative power than a negative-sum game for resources. The destruction of rival political factions is usually a very rational end in itself! Short term resource loss becomes less relevant, and a victor ends the war with far greater political power, which will give incredible pay-offs across generations!
Also, (a novel take, maybe) perhaps this combines with biases/irrational factors (survivorship bias) - most countries have a history of a glorious, successful, more zero-sum war with generational pay-offs (because this tends to be how countries get made), so they presume that future wars may have a similar payoff.
I'm worried that the "relative power" angle takes the "game" part of game theory a bit too literally. Like in a game of Civilization (or, in keeping with the fantasy theme, Smallville) the only check on your desire for power are other states/third parties.
So even a 0.01% chance of winning is better than a guaranteed loss of surrendering your territory.
But in real life, as long as you have literally any other goal than relative power, it behooves you to look for peaceful solutions to pursue them, if you know for sure (or with high probability) that you'd lose a war for sure. Perhaps the elves would prefer being subjugated to the Dwarven Empire to total eradication, or they'd rather be exiles, for example.
the survivorship bias thing is interesting! I should consider it more.